Abstract: This study examines the impact of credit rating upgrades and downgrades on six comprehensive banks' asset classes, profitability, leverage and size using data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's call reports and Bloomberg over the period [1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008]. In summary, the results suggest that a downgrade has a lasting and relatively more severe impact on banks than an upgrade; however, downgraded banks do not seem to effectively reduce their appetite for risk over a longer horizon. It seems that the role of credit rating agencies as an integral part of banks' prudential supervision through market discipline is, in a longer horizon, overstated.
Credit Rating Changes' Impact on Banks: Evidence from the US Banking Industry
Introduction.
In this paper we examine, to our knowledge for the first time in the literature, credit ratings changes' impact on banks. This subject is of great importance because of the emphasis on credit ratings role in bank prudential supervision. Thus, this paper aims to shed some light on the effectiveness of the employment of credit rating agencies on banks' regulatory and supervisory scheme. In particular, the study investigates the impact of upgrades and downgrades on six comprehensive banks' asset classes, profitability, leverage and size in one and two years' horizon after the credit rating change. For this, we use a novel dataset with data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) annual call reports and changes in the S&P long term issuer credit rating with data from Bloomberg for the 1989-2008 period. As in Kang and Liu (2009) , the difference-in-differences econometric approach, properly modified to take into account Bertrand et al. 's (2004) critique is implemented. The basic model is estimated using Heckman's two-step estimation method along with robustness checks based on an OLS approach that addresses the endogeneity and sample selection bias issues.
The main objective of banks is the processing of risk and information (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007) . The uniqueness of their business and essential role they play for the economy underscore the importance of monitoring their risks and supervise their behavior. Other intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies help resolving, at least in part, the problem of asymmetric information that plagues lending relationships. The rationale for credit ratings is based on the achievement of economies of scale in information production about credit risk and in the attempt to solve agency problems (e.g., Gonzalez et al., 2004) . This attempt yields the outcome of the extensive employment of ratings in asset management rules, as well as in banks' supervision and government regulations on financial institutions (Tang, 2009 ).
In the Basel II Capital Accord emphasis is placed on credit ratings and market disciplineone of the three pillars on which bank prudential supervision is based. This pillar is designed to employ market participants as disciplinary devices through increased disclosure and transparency.
Market discipline incorporates two distinct notions: market monitoring and market influence (Bliss and Flannery, 2002) . The first refers to the investors' ability to evaluate a bank's true value, while the second examines how market price changes affect managers' actions to offset adverse changes in the bank's condition.
Apart from market discipline however, banks also face regulatory discipline (Billett et al.
1998). As Berger et al. (2000) point out, credit rating agencies and bank supervisors have similar
incentives, as they are both concerned with default risk, and provide evidence that information produced by one of these two groups is subsequently incorporated into the other's assessment.
Thus, the impact of credit rating changes on banks may stem from their role as corporate device mechanisms as in the case of non-financial firms (Kisgen, 2006; Tang, 2009 ). Or, it could be the joint outcome of both market discipline triggered by a credit rating change and regulatory discipline -at least for downgraded banks, given the complement role supervisors and market participants have in the governance of financial institutions (Berger et al., 2000) .
Thus, to test whether the employment of credit rating agencies on this governance scheme is adequately effective, one should isolate the impact of credit rating changes on banks from the contemporaneous effect of possible regulatory actions, we examine whether the banks in our sample that received a rating change faced also an enforcement action adopted by US banking supervisory authorities. We do so in this paper using data on bank enforcement actions from the FDIC, OCC and FRB for the period examined.
Our results show that in the one year horizon after a rating change an upgrade results in an increase in net loans and profitability. A downgrade, however, results in an increase in loss allowance and other real estate owned, providing evidence for an effort of downgraded banks to reduce their loan portfolio risk and cleanse bad loans. Turning to the two-year horizon, upgraded banks continue to exhibit higher profitability and increase in size, while downgraded banks continue to increase their loss provisions, while they improve their liquidity position. Surprisingly though, there is evidence for an increase in their leverage and size. In summary, the findings suggest that a downgrade has a lasting and relatively more severe impact on banks than an upgrade; yet, downgraded banks seem to not effectively reduce their appetite for risk in a longer horizon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the market discipline of banks and on the role of credit ratings. Section 3 describes the data with the econometric methodology presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
Brief Literature Review.

Market discipline on banks
There is a relatively large empirical literature on the market discipline on banks. The literature focuses on the market monitoring component on banks' risks, providing mixed evidence on its effectiveness. For example, in the light of the recent financial turmoil, a possible systematic market failure in such a monitoring was put forth as a possible explanation (Flannery, 2008) . On the contrary, Palvia and Patro (2010) provide evidence that markets can indeed monitor banks effectively, reinforcing the role of market discipline as a supervisory mechanism. However, when it comes to market influence on banks' decisions, to the best of our knowledge, only Bliss and Flannery (2002) specifically examine the issue. They employ a large set of managerial action variables and stock and bond returns for the period 1986-1998 to investigate the role of market participants on the governance of bank holding companies. Their results do not provide strong evidence that stock or bond investors regularly touch upon managerial actions, although they find patterns consistent with market influence. Nevertheless, as Rajan (2001) argues, the result of market influence is hard to identify empirically.
Opaqueness, an inherent characteristic of banks, may alter market discipline and justifies bank regulation to mitigate the difficulty of bank assets' valuation. Conceptually, opaqueness is based on information asymmetry and is closely related to Knightian uncertainty more than to risk (Morgan, 2002) . Incompletely disclosed information, the uncertain quality and credibility of the disclosures, as well as the inherent complexity of the banking business and/or the ability of managers to rapidly transform assets may result in imprecise knowledge by the investors about the underlying profitability and risks of the firm (Myers and Rajan, 1998) .
The Role of the Credit Ratings
The role of credit rating agencies has increased considerably during recent years. However, there is an unsettled debate about credit ratings' impact and importance in the literature. On the positive side, Graham and Harvey (2001) show that credit ratings are more important in affecting a firm's funding policy than factors suggested by capital structure theories. Along this front, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) reveal that firms which issue rated bonds are more leveraged. Kisgen (2006 Kisgen ( , 2009 ) finds that firms close to a rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt than equity, relative to firms without a rating change. Tang (2009) also documents that credit ratings significantly affect firms' access to credit markets. Others, however, question the importance of credit ratings as providers of information. For example, Brealey and Myers (2003) argue that credit rating agencies reflect as much about market participants' opinion about a firm's financial condition as providing new information.
The consequences of rating changes on the valuation of stock and bonds have been extensively examined. For example, Hand et al. (1992) show that only rating downgrades have a negative impact on stock and bond prices, while upgrades' information is incorporated into prices prior to announcement. Ederington and Goh (1998) reveal that downgrades cause negative equity returns and analysts' earning forecast revisions. Brooks et al. (2004) confirm that rating changes have the same impact on countries' market returns as in the case of firms. Jorion et al. (2005) explore the effect of the Fair Disclosure (FD) Regulation in the US, which prohibited the selective, non-public disclosure of information by firms to favored investment analysts excluding credit rating agencies, to find that the informational effect on stock prices of downgrades and upgrades is much larger in the post-FD period.
In an effort to tie together the empirical findings, as well as to provide a comprehensive explanation for the increased role of credit ratings, Boot et al. The Standard and Poor's long term issuer credit rating, for which data is available for 370 financial entities over the period 1987-2009 is used. This initial credit rating sample includes 4,043 firm-year observations. We convert the letter long term issuer credit rating at the end of each year to a numerical scale as AAA=1, AA+=2,…, D=22, thus higher numbers correspond to lower ratings. The 370 financial entities contained in the initial credit rating sample are then matched with those included in the annual call reports. This matching process yields 295 entities, from which 201 are commercial banks and 94 bank holding companies.
From the annual call reports data ten financial account variables are calculated denoted as X 1 to X 10 for each banking firm.
1 Table 1 presents the financial account variables employed in the analysis.
Insert Table 1 here As The remaining four variables pertain to banks' profitability, leverage and size. More specifically, X 7 and X 8 refer to net income and total non-interest income. These two profitability measures could be viewed as not so discretionary as the other financial account variables employed in the analysis; however it is important in our opinion to examine the impact of rating changes on banks' profitability. All the above variables are scaled with total assets. Due to this scaling, the difference in economic size of the banking firms in the sample does not drive the results, nor does it affect their interpretation. Finally, X 9 measures total liabilities scaled by the book value of equity; and X 10 is the log of total assets. Surely, a change in some of these variables may not be a direct result of bank managerial actions after a credit rating change, but rather a reflection of the deteriorating/improving performance of the bank related indirectly to a rating change.
The call reports sample contains 6,019 firm-year observations on the ten financial account variables used, from which 4,154 pertain to commercial banks and the remaining 1,865 on bank holding companies. Finally, the two samples, the initial credit rating sample and the call reports sample are merged. This merged sample includes 2,895 firm-year observations for which both financial and credit ratings data are available with 1,848 observations on commercial banks and 1,047 on bank holding companies.
To examine the impact of credit rating changes on banks' financial account variables the difference-in-differences (henceforth, DD) technique following Kang and Liu (2009) is employed.
Each bank that has a rating that changed at year t, relative to its value at t-1, is defined as a 'treated' bank. Hence, the event date for the 'treatment' as t is identified. Then, for every 'treated' bank in the sample all 'untreated' banks are identified that satisfy the following three criteria, in order to properly function as candidate controls for the 'treated' bank: (1) the 'untreated' bank must have the same rating as the 'treated' bank at t-1, i.e., one year before the event date; (2) its rating remained unchanged for one year after t, i.e., until t+1; and (3) Furthermore, to mitigate concerns about the contemporaneous effect of possible regulatory actions, i.e., the regulatory discipline effect, we examined whether the banks in our final working dataset faced also an enforcement action adopted by the FDIC, OCC and FRB for the period examined. This examination yielded only 10 banks with an enforcement action imposed within 2 years after the rating change: 5 of them concerned upgraded banks and 5 downgraded ones. We included these banks for concerns about degrees of freedom and since they represent a very small fraction of the sample size. However, the results remained the same when we excluded these banks from the analysis. Bloomberg, while the second to the number of observations in the merged sample with data from the call reports.
Descriptive Statistics.
Insert Table 2 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the changes in the financial account variables of upgraded and downgraded banks over the t-1 to t+1 and t-1 to t periods, with t being the year of the credit rating change. The first column lists the variables, while the next two couples of columns report the mean and standard deviation of these variables for upgraded and downgraded banks, respectively. The last two columns report the difference between the means for these two groups of banks for each variable and the respective t-statistics.
Insert Table 3 here
As this table indicates, upgraded banks are significantly different from downgraded banks over both the t-1 to t+1 and t-1 to t periods with respect to the majority of the financial account variables examined. Specifically, over the t-1 to t+1 period the difference between the means of the change in net loans (DDX 1 ); loan loss allowance (DDX 2 ); other real estate owned (DDX 4 ); the sum of banks' premises and fixed assets (DDX 5 ); more transparent assets (DDX 6 ) and the log of total assets (DDX 10 ) are all significant at least at the 5% level. Only the mean difference in the change in trading assets (DDX 3 ) is significant at the 10% level, while there is no statistically significant difference for the change in net income (DDX 7 ), non-interest income (DDX 8 ) and leverage (DDX 9 ). A similar picture arises for the t-1 to t period, where only the difference between the means for upgraded and downgraded banks of the change in net loans (DX 1 ), non-interest income (DX 8 ) and leverage (DX 9 ) are insignificant.
Econometric Issues.
As already mentioned, to explore the impact of credit rating changes on banks' asset composition, profitability, leverage and size, the DD estimation method is employed. This method is widely used as a tool to examine the causal effect of a 'treatment' event, usually measured by a dummy variable, on a variable of interest that accounts for the characteristics and/or the behavior of the 'treated' group, i.e., the group that is exposed to this event. period, DX i , and its' value at t-1, X i lag1, as well as of variables other than the dependent variable at t-1, i.e., X j lag1 for , i j ≠ in some cases, is also suggested by the Ramsey's RESET specification test and the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria. To save space, the results of these tests are not reported but are available upon request. Thus, the basic model for the one year horizon after the rating change is formulated as:
where k takes the values from 1 to 10, spanning the ten financial account variables examined.
CRDUM is a dummy variable that takes the values of 1 and 0 for the 'treated' and control banks, respectively.
2 The focus is on the sign and significance of the estimated parameter . To further address the potential selection bias problem and the endogeneity of the CRDUM variable, the above model is estimated using Heckman's two-step estimation method in the two samples of upgraded and downgraded banks. The cluster robust standard errors method is used to deal with heteroskedasticity problems. Thus, in the first stage regression, CRDUM is estimated using the following probit model:
where X is a vector containing the explanatory variables employed in equation (1) and a set of instruments, Z, that are correlated with CRDUM and uncorrelated with the disturbance term in equation (1). Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The set of instruments includes seven variables: the change of the log assets from t-1 to t, DX 10 ; loss allowance to total assets at t-1, X 2 lag1; the sum of bank's premises and fixed assets, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangible assets to total assets at t-1, X 5 lag1; the sum of cash and balances due, total investment securities, interbank balances, and federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell to total assets at t-1, X 6 lag1; net income to total assets at t-1, X 7 lag1; log assets at t-1, X 10 lag1; and S&P's long term issuer credit rating at t-1, CRlag1.
The rationale for the use of these instrumental variables can be traced to their intuitive relationship with a credit rating change. Specifically, the change in the (log) of total assets, DX 10 , and the level of this variable at t-1, X 10 lag, proxy for the risk-taking behavior of banks (Flannery and Nikolova, 2004), as well as for bank's portfolio diversification capabilities, economies of scale and scope and access to capital markets. Loan loss allowance to total assets at t-1, X 2 lag1
provides a proxy for the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio. The sum of bank's premises and fixed assets, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangible assets to total assets at t-1, X 5 lag1, and the sum of cash and balances due, total investment securities, interbank balances, and federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell to total assets at t-1, X 6 lag1, proxy for the ability to absorb potential losses in their portfolios and for their level of liquidity.
Finally, net income to total assets at t-1, X 7 lag1, is a measure of the capability of a bank's asset portfolio to generate profits and thus, of its quality, while the lagged value of the bank's long term issuer credit rating is a proxy for the bank's overall credit quality and is expected to have a positive relationship with the probability of downgrade. Here, it must be stressed that the same set of these seven instruments is employed in equation (2) for both samples of upgraded and downgraded banks along with their controls. In other words, the same variables are used for the modeling the probability of an upgrade or a downgrade relatively to no rating change.
The correct econometric specification of the model in equation (2) is tested by the use of the likelihood ratio and the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic must fail to reject the null for the model to have an acceptable match between predicted and observed probabilities. Again, to save space, the results of these tests are not reported here but are available upon request.
To gain confidence with respect to the results, the analysis is repeated by employing the two stage least squares (TSLS) estimation technique in the above model. Specifically, the first stage regression (2) is estimated with OLS, i.e., a linear probability model is employed for the CRDUM variable. The over-identifying restrictions test, which fails to reject the null at the 5% confidence level for all 10 dependent variables, is performed which yields essentially the same results. To economize on space, these results are available upon request.
An OLS approach.
As an additional robustness check, following Kang and Liu's (2009) approach, the impact of credit rating changes on banks' characteristics is examined using a model which abstracts from the need of instruments for the estimation. Specifically, the dataset is restructured by splitting each variable employed to form two distinct series: one comprising of the values for the 'treated' banks and one for their controls. Then the following model is estimated with OLS:
where CNTRDDX i is the change in the variable of interest for the control banks and DDX i is the relevant change for the 'treated' banks. Here, the coefficient of interest is . bank's decisions and performance, irrespective of its rating change.
Impact on Two Years Horizon.
The impact of credit rating change on upgraded and downgraded banks is further examined in a two year horizon after the change. Thus, the variable denoted as DDX i av2, i=1,..,10 is calculated as the average value of the respective X i variable at t+1 and t+2, minus its value at t-1, as in Kang and Liu (2009). Due to missing data at t+2 for some banks, these longer horizon samples include 126 pairs that refer to upgraded banks matched with their controls and 94 pairs to downgraded banks. DDX i av2 is used as the dependent variable, while the covariates DDX i av2lag1, i=1,.., 10 are defined as the average value of the respective X i variable at t+1 and t, minus its value at t-2.
The Ramsey's RESET specification test and the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria are performed yielding the basic model as follows:
The Heckman two-step estimation method is undertaken in equation (4), as well as the TSLS method described above for robustness check, while the relevant model in the OLS approach has the form:
Results.
The results are reported in Tables 4 to 11. All tables have the same structure. The first row shows the dependent variables, i.e., the ten financial account variables examined, while the other rows report the estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) of the explanatory variables, the number of observations and the Wald statistic or the adjusted R 2 for the two methods employed, respectively. The last two rows in Tables 4, 6 To make sense of the huge amount of information generated by the empirical analysis, the focus is on the following issues: First, the financial account variables for upgraded and downgraded banks for which the coefficients of interest, i.e., the coefficient of the CRDUM variable in equation (1) and the intercept in equation (3) are significant, as well as their sign.
Second, whether the financial account variables that are significant in the one-year horizon are the same with those in the two-year horizon, i.e., whether a rating change has a lasting impact on banks.
Summarizing the main results, there is a statistically significant increase in net loans and profitability in the one year horizon after the rating change for upgraded banks relative to their control banks for which there is no rating change. These findings are confirmed for both models employed, while there is weak evidence of a decrease in loss allowance to total assets. Indeed, the results from equation (1) indicate that the coefficient of CRDUM for the DDX 2 dependent variable is negative and significant, while the intercept is insignificant in equation (3) for the relevant variable. However, for downgraded banks all estimation approaches indicate that loss allowance and other real estate owned are both significant and positive in the one year horizon after the rating change. These findings show that in the short term, downgraded banks make an effort to reduce their loan portfolio risk and cleanse bad loans.
Turning to the two-year horizon after a rating change, upgraded banks continue to perform better than their controls since they exhibit higher profitability, while the coefficient for net loans is no longer significant. Furthermore, upgraded banks increase in size, since the coefficients of interest for the DDX 10 variable in both models is highly significant and positive. However, for More details follow.
Upgraded Banks -One Year Horizon.
As Table 4 documents, for the change in net loans to total assets, DDX 1 , the CRDUM variable is positive and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that upgraded banks expand net credit more than their controls. Other significant explanatory variables are the change in net loans for the t-1 to t period, DX 1 , and the level of net loans at t-1, X 1 lag1, with a positive and negative sign, respectively. Additionally, the change from t-2 to t in log assets, DDX 10 lag1 and the values at t-1 of X 5 and X 10 which measure fixed assets and subsidiaries and the size of banks are significant, all with negative sign. The Wald statistic is 391.94 and highly significant, while the statistics for the first stage regression indicate that the instruments employed for the CRDUM variable are satisfactory.
Insert Table 4 here For the change in loss allowance to total assets, DDX 2 , the coefficient of CRDUM is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that upgraded banks reduce their provisions, a strategy which may be the outcome of a more prudent credit expansion policy, or, equally plausible, of a less conservative and more optimistic management of risk. As before, lagged changes and values of loss allowance, profitability and size are significant in explaining the variation of the dependent variable.
Lastly, the only other dependent variable for which CRDUM is significant at the 1% level, with a positive sign, is the change in net income to total assets, DDX 7 . This result suggests that upgraded banks are becoming more profitable than their pairs. In the present analysis, we do not examine where this increased profitability stems for but leave this for future research. The changes from t-2 to t of loss allowance, DDX 2 lag1, trading assets, DDX 3 lag1, and fixed assets, DDX 5 lag1, are also significant with mixed signs, indicating that changes in banks' asset composition affect its profitability in a rather complicated way. The lagged changes and the value at t-1 of net income also play their role, as indicated by the significance of DDX 7 lag1, DX 7 and X 7 lag1, coupled with the values at t-1 of loss allowance, X 2 lag1, liquidity, X 6 lag1, and size, X 10 lag1. Table 5 confirms the above results. Indeed, for the change in net loans to total assets the intercept is positive and significant at the 10% level, while the model explains 39.9% of the variation of the dependent variable. As for net income, the intercept is again positive and significant, but now at the 10% level, with adjusted R 2 equal to 0.389. The same is not true, however, for the change in loss allowance.
Insert Table 5 here Downgraded Banks -One Year Horizon.
For the sample of downgraded banks, the results of Table 6 indicate that when the change in loss allowance, DDX 2 , is employed as the dependent variable, CRDUM is significant with a positive sign. Thus, a downward revision of a bank's credit rating seems to act as a disciplinary mechanism that forces bank managers to reduce their loan portfolio risk. Alternatively, it could also be the outcome of asset quality deterioration caused by the downgrading. Specifically, a downgraded bank faces increased borrowing costs and/or deteriorated reputation which serves as an incentive for the banks to take more risks in lending. The relatively large number of the other explanatory variables that are significant for this model suggests that for the increase in loss allowance for downgraded banks, their asset composition, profitability, leverage and size are taken into account.
Insert Table 6 here CRDUM is also significant and positive for the change in other real estate owned, DDX 4 ,. As previously mentioned, this variable measures real estate taken in settlement of problem loans plus real estate investments, other than bank premises. As such, this finding indicates that downgraded banks make an effort to cleanse their portfolio from bad loans. The results of the OLS approach for this sample, reported in Table 7 , are in full accordance with the above. Only the intercepts for DDX 2 and DDX 4 are significant and positive.
Insert Table 7 here
Two Years Horizon.
Turning to the two years horizon after the rating change, the results of the Heckman's two-step estimation method and the OLS approach for the sample of upgraded banks are summarized in Tables 8 and 9 . As both tables document, upgraded banks continue to have increased profitability relatively to their pairs over a two years horizon after the rating change, since CRDUM and the intercept for the two models, respectively, are significant with positive sign. The same holds for the change in log assets. Upgraded banks are increasing in size.
Insert Tables 8 and 9 here
As far as downgraded banks, Tables 10 and 11 report that several financial accounts increases are in order after the downgrade. In the loss allowance equation, DDX 2 , the coefficients for both the CRDUM variable in equation (1) and the intercept in equation (3) are positive and significant. In the liquidity equation, DDX 6 , the coefficients for the CRDUM variable and the intercept are also significant. This is possibly the result of a more precautionary policy of the downgraded bank in terms of liquidity, rather than a change in its lending activity, as suggested by the non-significant results for the total loans equation, DDX 1 . This could be achieved either through higher cash balances and/or higher level of investment securities held in bank's portfolio which points to a change in bank's asset management. Certainly, a more detailed analysis is needed, which, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, to investigate which forces drive the increased liquidity position of downgraded banks. In the leverage and size equations, DDX 9 and DDX 10 , respectively, the relevant coefficients are positive and significant as well. The statistical significance of the respective coefficients for these variables, as well as for liquidity, DDX 6 , is lower in the Heckman's Two-step Estimation Method than in the OLS approach. However, this should be attributed to the less precise estimate of the instrumental variable approach. The latter findings are surprising, since both increased leverage and size point to a more risky institution.
Rationally, a downgrade should lead to the opposite result. A possible explanation is that in the long run a downgrade provides incentives to banks to take higher risks in an effort to improve their rating quality. To put it differently, it seems that a downgrade disciplines banks only in the short term. As for net income, DDX 7 , only the intercept in equation (3) is positive and significant, while the CRDUM in equation (1) is insignificant.
Insert Tables 10 and 11 here
Conclusions and Policy Implications.
This study examines credit ratings' impact on banks. Specifically, the study investigates the impact of upgrades and downgrades on six comprehensive banks' asset classes, profitability, leverage and size in one and two years' horizon after the rating change. The results indicate that in the one year horizon after a rating change an upgrade results in an increase in net loans and profitability. This finding probably reflects a decrease in the price of wholesale funding, combined with increased loan market shares for these banks. A downgrade, however, results in an increase in loss allowance and other real estate owned, providing evidence for an effort of downgraded banks to reduce their loan portfolio risk and cleanse bad loans.
Turning to the two-year horizon after a rating change, upgraded banks continue to exhibit higher profitability and increase in size. The latter is evidence of an increase in risk-taking behavior (Flannery and Nikolova, 2004). Downgraded banks continue to increase their loss provisions, while they improve their liquidity position. Surprisingly though, there is evidence for an increase in their leverage and size, possibly as an outcome of these banks' effort to improve their rating quality, however in a more risky way. In summary, the findings suggest that a downgrade has a lasting and relatively more severe impact on banks than an upgrade; yet, downgraded banks seem to not effectively reduce their appetite for risk in a longer horizon.
The above evidence corroborates that credit ratings do serve as corporate governance devices and impact banks' asset and liability management. To put it differently, credit ratings have real economic decision-making consequences for banks, as Kisgen (2006) and Tang (2009) argue when examining non-financial firms. It seems, however, that the role of credit rating agencies as an integral part of banks' prudential supervision through market discipline is, in a longer horizon, overstated. This paper's findings point to increased supervisors' responsibility for deterring banks' risk taking behavior -especially for downgraded banks -and evaluating its performance towards the goal of a sound financial system. The optimal mix between rating agencies and supervisory authorities' roles in the context of an improved regulation and supervision scheme remains an open question. 3. In Panel A, each cell reports the number of observations in the initial credit rating sample obtained from Bloomberg and the number of observations for the merged sample with data from the call reports after the slash. 4. In Panels B and C each cell reports the number of credit rating changes in the initial credit rating sample obtained from Bloomberg and the relevant number of observations in the final working dataset after the slash. 9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 10. The last two rows report statistics from the firs stage probit regression model for CRDUM. 11. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors' calculations. X 1 : (Total loans and leases, gross -Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total assets X 2 : Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets X 3 : Trading assets, total / Total assets X 4 : Other real estate owned / Total assets X 5 : (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets X 6 : (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / Total Assets X 7 : Net income / Total assets X 8 : Total non interest income / Total assets X 9 : Total liabilities / Book value of equity X 10 : Log (Total assets) 3. DDX i : Change in variable X i between t-11 and t+1 for the 'treated' banks. 4. CNTRLDDX i : Change in variable X i between t-1 and t+1 for the control banks. 5. DDX i lag1: Change in variable X i between t-2 and t for the 'treated' banks. 6. DX i : Change in variable X i between t-1 and t for the 'treated' banks. 7. X i lag1: Value of variable X i at t-1 for the 'treated' banks.. 8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 10. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors' calculations. X 1 : (Total loans and leases, gross -Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total assets X 2 : Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets X 3 : Trading assets, total / Total assets X 4 : Other real estate owned / Total assets X 5 : (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets X 6 : (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / Total Assets X 7 : Net income / Total assets X 8 : Total non interest income / Total assets X 9 : Total liabilities / Book value of equity X 10 : Log (Total assets) 3. DDX i av2: Change in variable X i between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period for the 'treated' banks. 
